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ABSTRACT
To question the statistical significance of return predictability, we cannot specify a null that simply
turns off that predictability, leaving dividend growth predictability at its essentially zero sample
value. If neither returns nor dividend growth are predictable, then the dividend-price ratio is a
constant. If the null turns off return predictability, it must turn on the predictability of dividend
growth, and then confront the evidence against such predictability in the data. I find that the absence
of dividend growth predictability gives much stronger statistical evidence against the null, with
roughly 1-2% probability values, than does the presence of return predictability, which only gives
about 20% probability values. I argue that tests based on long-run return and dividend growth
regressions provide the cleanest and most interpretable evidence on return predictability, again
delivering about 1-2% probability values against the hypothesis that returns are unpredictable. I show
that Goyal and Welch's (2005) finding of poor out-of-sample R² does not reject return forecastability.
Out-of-sample R² is poor even if all dividend yield variation comes from time-varying expected
returns.
John H. Cochrane
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Are stock returns predictable? Table 1 presents regressions of the real and excess value-weighted
stock return on its dividend-price ratio, in annual data. In contrast to the simple “random
walk” view, stock returns do seem predictable. Similar or stronger forecasts result from many
variations of the right and left hand variables and in postwar data.
Regression bt R2(%) σ(bx)(%)
Rt+1 = a + b(Dt/Pt)+εt+1 3.39 2.28 5.8 4.9
Rt+1 − R
f
t = a + b(Dt/Pt)+εt+1 3.83 2.61 7.4 5.6
Dt+1/Dt = a + b(Dt/Pt)+εt+1 0.07 0.06 0.0001 0.001
rt+1 = ar + br(dt − pt)+εt+1 0.097 1.92 4.0 4.0
∆dt+1 = ad + bd(dt − pt)+εt+1 0.008 0.18 0.00 0.003
Table 1. Forecasting regressions. Rt+1 is the real return, deﬂated by the CPI,
Dt+1/Dt is real dividend growth, and Dt/Pt is the dividend-price ratio of the CRSP
value-weighted portfolio. R
f
t+1 is the real return on three-month Treasury Bills.
Small letters are logs of corresponding capital letters. Annual data, 1926-2004. σ(bx)
gives the standard deviation of the ﬁtted value of the regression.
Economic Signiﬁcance
T h ee s t i m a t e si nT a b l e1h a v ev e r yl a r g eeconomic signiﬁcance. The standard deviation of
expected returns in the last column of Table 1 is about 5 percentage points, almost as large
as the 7.7% level of the equity premium in this sample. Thus, the equity premium varies over
time by as much as its unconditional mean. The 4% to 7% R2 do not look that impressive, but,
as emphasized by Fama and French (1988), the R2 rises with horizon, reaching values between
30 and 60 percent, depending on time period and estimation details. The coeﬃcient of over
three in the top two rows means that when dividend yields rise one percentage point, prices
rise another two percentage points on average, rather than declining one percentage point to
oﬀset the extra dividends. Finally, prices vary if expected returns (discount rates) vary, and the
return forecastability shown in Table 1 neatly accounts for all variation in stock prices scaled by
dividends. (I present the calculation below). In place of the traditional view that price-dividend
ratios rise on news of higher future dividends, or the skeptics’ claim that bubbles are needed
to account for price volatility, the regressions of Table 1 imply that all v a r i a t i o ni nm a r k e t
price-dividend ratios corresponds to changes in expected excess returns, i.e. risk premiums.
Statistical Signiﬁcance
However, the statistical signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst row of Table 1 is marginal, with a t-statistic
only a bit above two. And the ink was hardly dry on the ﬁrst studies1 to run regressions
like those of Table 1 before a large literature sprang up examining their econometric properties
and questioning that statistical signiﬁcance. The right hand variable (dividend yield) is very
persistent, and return shocks are negatively correlated with dividend yield shocks, since a change
in prices moves both variables. As a result, the return-forecast regression inherits the near-unit-
root properties of the dividend yield. The coeﬃcient is biased upward, and the t-statistic is
biased towards rejection.
1Rozeﬀ (1984), Shiller (1984), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Fama and
French (1988).
2Goetzmann and Jorion (1993) and Nelson and Kim (1993) found the distribution of the
return-forecasting coeﬃcient by simulation, and they found that the statistical signiﬁcance of
return-forecasting coeﬃcients is much lower than the t-statistics of Table 1 would lead one to
believe. Most clearly, Stambaugh (1999) derived the ﬁnite-sample distribution of the return-
forecasting regression, showing analytically the bias in the return forecast coeﬃcient and the
ﬁnite-sample standard errors. In monthly regressions, Stambaugh found that in place of OLS
p-values of 6% (1927-1996) and 2% (1952-1996), the correct p-values are 17% and 15% — the
regressions are far from statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.2
Does this evidence mean return forecastability is dead? No, and the key is in the dividend
growth regressions of Table 1. Dividends are clearly not forecastable at all. In fact, the small
point estimates have the wrong sign — a high dividend yield means a low price, which should
signal lower, not higher, future dividend growth.
If both returns and dividend growth are unforecastable, then present value logic implies that
the price/dividend ratio is a constant, which it surely is not. Alternatively (in cointegration
language), since the dividend yield is stationary, one of dividend growth or price growth must
be forecastable to bring the dividend yield back following a shock. We cannot just ask “Are
returns forecastable?” We must ask “which of dividend growth or returns is forecastable?” (Or
really, “how much of each?”)
Therefore, if we want to set up a null hypothesis in which returns are not forecastable,
that null hypothesis must also specify dividend growth that is forecastable, and the statistical
evaluation of that null must also confront the lack of dividend-growth forecastability in the data.
I set up such a null, and I evaluate the joint distribution of return and dividend-growth
forecasting coeﬃcients. I conﬁrm that the return forecasting coeﬃcient, taken alone, is not
signiﬁcant, as Stambaugh and others ﬁnd. Under the unforecastable-return null, we see return
forecast coeﬃcients as large or larger than those in the data about 20% of the time. However,
I ﬁnd that the absence of dividend growth forecastability oﬀers much more signiﬁcant evidence
against the null. The best overall number is a 1-2% probability value (last row of Table 5) — we
only see dividend growth that fails to be forecastable in 1-2% of the samples generated under
the null. The important evidence, as in Sherlock Holmes’ famous case, is the dog that does not
bark.3
Equivalent Views and Long-Run Regressions
There are several equivalent ways of stating the same point, and I connect them. They stem
from the approximate identity (derived below),
br =1− ρφ + bd, (1)
where br is the regression coeﬃcient of log returns on the log dividend yield, bd is the coeﬃcient
of log dividend growth on the log dividend yield, φ is the dividend yield autocorrelation, and
ρ ≈ 0.96 is a constant. This identity holds in each sample as well as for population moments.
2Additional contributions include Kothari and Shanken (1997), Paye and Timmermann (2003), Torous, Valka-
nov and Yan (2004) and Ang and Bekaert (2005).
3Inspector Gregory: “Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
Holmes: “To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night time.”
“That was the curious incident.”
From “The Adventure of Silver Blaze” by Arthur Conan Doyle
3First, we can focus on the joint distribution of (br,φ), leaving bd implied, rather than focus
on the joint distribution (br,b d), leaving φ implied. This is the more conventional framing of the
problem, as it allows us to consider forecasting variables that do not include dividends. In the
data, we see a relatively high estimate ˆ φ ≈ 0.94 along with the large return-forecast estimate
ˆ br ≈ 0.1 as in Table 1. There is a strong negative correlation between br and φ estimates,
however. Therefore, while under the null we often see br higher than in the data - the marginal
distribution of br does not reject — almost all of those high br draws come with low φ estimates.
We almost never see events with br as high as we have seen in our sample and φ as high as we
have seen in our sample.






=1 ( 2 )
The terms of this identity represent the fractions of dividend yield variance due to changing
expected returns to changing expected dividend growth respectively. (I show this below.) They
also represent the implied coeﬃcients in regressions of long-run returns
P∞
j=1 ρj−1rt+j and long-
run dividend growth
P∞
j=1 ρj−1∆dt+j on dividend yields.
We can also base a test of return forecastability on the long-run return-forecasting coeﬃcient
br/(1 − ρφ). I ﬁnd that tests based on these long-run coeﬃcients reject the null with 1-2%
probability values. The greater power comes from the negative correlation between br and φ.
Samples with large br typically have small values of φ, and therefore do not have large values of
br/(1 − ρφ).
Stating null and alternative in terms of the long-run regression coeﬃcients simpliﬁes and
clariﬁes the analysis considerably. It condenses the joint distribution of (br,φ)i n t oas i n g l e
n u m b e r .I tc a p t u r e si nt h a tn u m b e rt h eo b s e r v a t i o nt h a tw ed on o ts e eh i g hbr without low φ.
Since the long-run return and long-run dividend coeﬃcients in (2) are mechanically related, we
do not have to worry whether it is more interesting to test br,b d or some other aspect of the
joint distribution.
The question is, what set of draws do we consider “more extreme” than the observed sample,
to put in the rejection region of a test statistic? If we base a test statistic on the return-forecast
coeﬃcient br alone, then many of the draws that produce br larger than the value seen in the
data also have lower φ than in our data ((br,φ) distribution), or they have lower bd than in our
data ((br,b d) distribution). These draws do have forecastable dividend growth, and dividend
yield variation is partially due to changing dividend growth forecasts — their dogs do bark. It
makes sense therefore to consider such draws “closer to the null” than our data, even though br
is greater than in our data. This is how the long-run coeﬃcients count such events, resulting in
small probability values for events that really are, by this measure, “more extreme” than our
data.
Third, the identity (1) shows that we can in fact have both unforecastable returns br =0
and unforecastable dividend growth bd =0i fφ =1 /ρ ≈ 1.04. But this speciﬁcation requires an
explosive root in the dividend yield. Thus, the extra information we get about return forecasta-
bility from dividend forecasts bd or dividend yield forecasts φ comes from prior information that
φ<1.04. Stronger evidence comes by imposing φ<1. This is eminently sensible extra infor-
mation, as I argue at length below. It makes neither statistical nor economic sense to consider
dividend yields that have explosive roots. But it is extra information, and it is its imposition
that allows us to use information in bd or φ to sharpen our knowledge about br.T h i sl a s tp o i n ti s
4the essence of Lewellen’s (2004) calculations, and he also ﬁnds strong statistical evidence against
the null of unpredictable returns.
Powerful Long-Horizon Regressions?
This success leads us to another econometric controversy. Fama and French (1988) found
that return-forecast t statistics rise with horizon, suggesting that long-horizon return regressions
give greater statistical evidence for return forecastability. This ﬁnding has been subject to even
greater scrutiny than the one-period regression statistics. Much of this literature concludes that
long-horizon estimates do not, in fact, have better statistical power than one-period regressions.
Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2006) are the most recent example, and they survey the
literature. Their Table 5, top row, gives probability values for return forecasts from dividend-
price ratios at 1-5 year horizons, based on simulations similar to mine. They report 15%, 14%,
13%, 12%, 17% values. In short, they ﬁnd no advantage to long horizon regressions.
In this context, how do I ﬁnd such large power advantages for long-horizon regression coeﬃ-
cients? The main answer is that typical long-horizon estimates do not go far out enough to see
the power beneﬁts. I conﬁrm that regression coeﬃcients at 5 and 10 year horizons do not reject
much more often than one-year regressions, but I also show that long-horizon regressions give
low (below 5%) probability values once one looks past 10 years.
The intuition is straightforward. Regression coeﬃcients rise with horizon as a result of the
one-period forecastability together with the persistence of the forecasting variable (Campbell
and Shiller 1991). For example, the two-year and three-year return-forecasting coeﬃcients are
b
(2)
r = br(1 + φ)a n db
(3)
r = br(1 + φ + φ2) respectively. By this fact, long-horizon return
regressions are poised to exploit the negative correlation between br and φ estimates. Samples
that produce a br larger than we see in our data typically also produce a φ lower than we see
in our data. Thus, they typically do not produce coeﬃcients that rise with horizon as do those
in our data, and they do not produce large long-horizon regression coeﬃcients. The trouble is
that this mechanism is not quantitatively strong in two, ﬁve or even ten year horizon regressions.
br and φ vary roughly one-for-one across samples, so the combination of br and φ that one
looks at needs also to vary about one-for-one. Since br ≈ 0.1, the two-year regression coeﬃcient
b
(2)
r = br(1 + φ) only weights variation in φ by 0.1 times as much as it weights variation in br.
Three, ﬁve, or even ten-year return regressions still do not weight φ heavily enough.
This ﬁnding does not mean one should construct 30 year returns and regress them directly
on dividend yields or other forecasting variables. The diﬀerence between direct and implied
estimates is a second reason I ﬁnd strong rejections and the literature culminating in Boudoukh,
Richardson and Whitelaw (2006) does not. For example, one can compute the three-year return
regression by forming three-year returns and regressing them on the initial dividend yield, or one
can compute the quantity b
(3)
r = br(1 + φ + φ2) from the one-year regression coeﬃcients br and
φ. Like all “nonparametric” estimates, the direct regressions can pick up temporal dynamics
not captured by low order VAR models, but at the cost of imprecise estimates. This, I think is
the major message of Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2006): in “small” samples, direct
long-horizon estimates can lose the power advantages inherent in a better statistic by poorer
measurement.
We obtain therefore a nice resolution of this statistical controversy. I reproduce results
such as Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw’s (2006) that direct regressions at one to ﬁve year
horizons have little power advantages over one year regressions, but I also agree with results such
as Campbell’s (2001) and Valkanov’s (2003) that there are power advantages to long-horizon
5regressions, advantages which are maximized at very long horizons.
Out of sample R2
Goyal and Welch (2003), (2005) ﬁnd that return forecasts based on dividend yields and a
number of other variables do not work out of sample. They compare forecasts in which one
estimates the regression using data up to time t to forecast returns at t+1 with forecasts using
the sample mean in the same period. They ﬁnd that the sample mean produces a better
out-of-sample prediction than do the return-forecasting regressions.
Ic o n ﬁrm Goyal and Welch’s observation that out-of-sample return forecasts are poor, but I
show that this result is to be expected. Setting up a null in which return forecasts account for all
dividend yield volatility, I ﬁnd out-of-sample performance as bad or worse than that in the data
about 30-40% of the time. With a highly persistent right hand variable, it is hard to measure
the regression coeﬃcient accurately in “short” samples. Thus, this observation does not provide
a statistical rejection of forecastable returns. Out of sample R2 is an interesting diagnostic,
but it is not a test; it is not a statistic that somehow gives us better power to distinguish
alternatives than conventional full-sample hypothesis tests. Instead, Goyal and Welch’s ﬁndings
are an important caution about the practical usefulness of return forecasts in forming aggressive
market-timing portfolios given currently available data.
A Common Confusion
One should not come away with the impression that “returns are not forecastable, but we
can somehow infer their forecastability from dividend evidence.” The issue is hypothesis tests,
not point estimates. The point estimates are, as always and as in Table 1, that returns are very
forecastable, where the adjective “very” means by any economic metric. The point estimate
(possibly with bias adjustments) remains anyone’s best guess. The issue is statistical — “what
is the chance that we see something as large as Table 1 by chance, if returns are truly not
forecastable?” Stambaugh’s (1999) answer is about 15%, and my weaker annual regressions give
about 20%. 15% is still not 50% or 90%, so zero return forecastability is still not that likely.
“Failing to reject the null” does not mean that we can comfortably accept the i.i.d. world view.
The point estimate says that every time of high prices (low dividend yields) in the past 80 years
has been resolved by low subsequent returns, and not by higher dividend growth. Even if there
is a 15% chance that this happened by luck, that high prices “truly” correspond to high dividend
growth forecasts and not to low return forecasts, the fact that there is only a 15% chance this
is true should give one great pause before proclaiming that today’s high prices really have no
signal about next year’s returns.
In this context, I point out that the null of unforecastable returns has other implications
which one can also test — the implication that we should see a large dividend growth forecast,
a low dividend-yield autocorrelation, and a small “long-run” return forecast. Looking at these
other statistics, we can say that there is in fact less than a 5% chance that our data or something
more extreme is generated by a world with unpredictable returns. But this evidence, like the
return-based evidence, also does nothing to change the point estimate.
62N u l l h y p o t h e s i s
To keep the analysis simple, I consider a ﬁrst order VAR representation of log returns, log
dividend yields, and log dividend growth,
rt+1 = ar + br(dt − pt)+εr
t+1 (3)
∆dt+1 = ad + bd(dt − pt)+εd
t+1 (4)
dt+1 − pt+1 = adp + φ(dt − pt)+ε
dp
t+1. (5)
Returns and dividend growth do not add much forecast power, nor do further lags of dividend
yields. Of course, adding more variables can only make returns more forecastable.
The Campbell-Shiller linearization of the deﬁnition of a return4 Rt+1 =( Pt+1 + Dt+1)/Pt
gives the approximate identity
rt+1 = ρ(pt+1 − dt+1)+∆dt+1 − (pt − dt), (6)
where ρ = PD/(1 + PD), PD is the price-dividend ratio about which one linearizes, and low-
ercase letters are logarithms of corresponding capital letters. This identity links the regression
coeﬃcients and errors of the VAR (3)-(5). First, projecting on dt−pt, identity (6) implies that
the regression coeﬃcients obey the approximate identity
br =1− ρφ + bd. (7)






Thus, the three equations (3)-(5) are redundant. One can infer the coeﬃcients and error of any
one equation from those of the other two.
The identity (7) shows clearly how we cannot simply take br = 0 without changing the
dividend growth forecast bd or the dividend yield autocorrelation φ. If one changes bd or φ,t h e n
the reduced ﬁt of the dividend growth or dividend yield forecasts become evidence against the
null as well. In particular, as long as φ is nonexplosive, φ<1/ρ ≈ 1.04, we cannot choose a
null in which both dividend growth and returns are unforecastable, i.e. in which both br =0
and bd = 0. To generate a coherent null with br =0 ,w em u s ta s s u m ea ne q u a l l yl a r g ebd of the
opposite sign, and then we must address the failure of this dividend growth forecastability in
the data.
























(pt+1 − dt+1)+∆dt+1 − (pt − dt)
where P/D is the point of linearization. Ignoring means, and deﬁning ρ =
P/D
1+P/D, we obtain Equation (6).
7By subtracting inﬂation from both sides, Equations (6)-(8) can apply to real returns and
real dividend growth. Subtracting the riskfree rate from both sides, we can relate the excess log
return rt+1−r
f
t to dividend growth less the interest rate ∆dt+1−r
f
t . One can either introduce an
extra interest rate term and error or simply understand the need to forecast “dividend growth”
to include both terms. I focus on real returns and real dividend growth, and I present some
results for excess returns. Overall, the results are quite similar with all three data deﬁnitions.
To form a null hypothesis, then, I start with estimates of (3)-(5) formed from regressions of
log real returns, log real dividend growth and the log dividend yield in annual CRSP data, 1927-
2004, displayed in Table 2. The coeﬃcients are worth keeping in mind. The return-forecasting
coeﬃcient is br ≈ 0.10, the dividend growth forecasting coeﬃcient is bd ≈ 0, and the OLS
estimate of the dividend yield autocorrelation is φ ≈ 0.94. The standard errors are about the
s a m e ,0 . 0 5i ne a c hc a s e .
ε s. d. (diagonal)
Estimates and correlation. Null
ˆ b, ˆ φσ (ˆ b)i m p l i e d r ∆dd p b,φ
r 0.097 0.050 0.101 19.6 66 -70 0
∆d 0.008 0.044 0.004 66 14.0 7.5 -0.0931
dp 0.941 0.047 0.945 -70 7.5 15.3 0.941
Table 2. Forecasting regressions and null hypothesis. Each row represents an
OLS forecasting regression on the log dividend yield in annual CRSP data 1927-
2004. For example, the ﬁrst row presents the regression rt+1 = ar+br(dt−pt)+εr
t+1.
Standard errors σ(ˆ b) include a GMM correction for heteroskedasticity. The “implied”
column calculates each coeﬃcient based on the other two coeﬃcients and the identity
br =1− ρφ + bd,u s i n gρ =0 .9638. The diagonals of the “ε s. d.” matrix give the
standard deviation of the regression errors in percent; the oﬀ-diagonals give the
correlation between errors in percent. The “Null” column describes coeﬃcients used
to simulate data under the null hypothesis that returns are not predictable.
Alas, the identity (7) is not exact. The “implied” column of Table 2 gives each coeﬃcient
implied by the other two equations and the identity linking the regression coeﬃcients (7). The
diﬀerence is small, about 0.005 in each case, but large enough to make a visible diﬀerence in the
results. For example, the t-statistic calculated from the implied br coeﬃcient is 0.101/0.050 =
2.02 rather than 0.097/0.05 = 1.94, and we will see as much as 2-3 percentage point diﬀerences
in probability values to follow. In this and all remaining calculations I calculate ρ from the mean




The middle three columns of Table 2 present the error standard deviations down the diagonal
and correlations on the oﬀ-diagonal. Returns have almost 20% standard deviation. Dividend
growth has a large 14% standard deviation. In part, this number comes from large variability in
dividends in the prewar data. In part, the standard method for recovering dividends from the
CRSP returns5 means that dividends paid early in the year are reinvested at the market return












8to the end of the year. In part, aggregate dividends, which include all cash payouts, are in fact
quite volatile.
Most importantly for the joint distributions that follow, return and dividend yield shocks are
strongly negatively correlated (-70%), in contrast to the nearly zero correlation between dividend
growth and dividend yield shocks (7.5%). The negatively correlated shocks result in a strong
negative correlation between br and φ estimates. In turn, that correlation between estimates
underlies the interesting econometrics of the return-forecast coeﬃcient br and the stronger power
of joint and long-run estimates.
The ﬁnal columns of Table 2 present the coeﬃcients of the null hypothesis I use to simulate
distributions. I set br = 0. I start by choosing φ at its sample estimate φ =0 .941. I consider
alternative and especially larger values of φ below. Given br =0a n dφ, the necessary dividend
forecast coeﬃcient bd follows from the identity bd = ρφ − 1+br.
We have to choose two variables to simulate and then let the third follow from the identity
(6). I simulate the dividend growth and dividend yield system. However, the identity (6) holds
well enough that this choice has almost no eﬀect on the results.


































I use the sample estimate of the covariance matrix of εdp and εd. I simulate 50,000 artiﬁcial
data points from each null. I draw the ﬁrst observation d0 − p0 from the unconditional density








; then I draw εd
t and ε
dp
t as random normals and simulate
the system forward.
2.1 A structural interpretation and the correlation of shocks
The null hypothesis can be given a deeper and more structural interpretation. This interpretation
gives a bit more conﬁdence that the null really does represent a consistent view of the world,
and it is helpful to understand the strong negative correlation between return and dividend-yield
shocks that is central to the whole aﬀair.
Suppose that expected dividend growth follows an AR(1) process,
∆dt+1 = xt + δd
t+1 (10)
xt+1 = φxt + δx
t+1 (11)
and expected returns are constant. Using the Campbell-Shiller (1988) present value identity














Cochrane (1991) shows that this procedure implies that dividends paid early in the year are reinvested at the
return R to the end of the year. Accumulating dividends at a diﬀerent rate is an attractive alternative, but then
returns, prices and dividends would no longer obey the identity Rt+1 =( Pt+1 +Dt+1)/Pt with end-of year prices.
9that results from iterating (6) forwards,
pt − dt = Et
∞ X
j=1
ρj−1 (∆dt+j − rt+j),
we then have















































This is exactly the null hypothesis of (9).
We can relate the regression errors ε in (9) to the “structural” shocks δ. The dividend-yield
shock is proportional to the shock to expected dividend growth δx. When there is news of higher
expected future dividend growth, prices go up today. Thus, in the context of the null, we can
label the dividend-yield shock as a “shock to expected dividend growth.” The ex-post dividend
growth shock is just that, structurally or as a regression error. The return shock is a combination
of the dividend-growth shock and the expected dividend growth shock. Returns are high if there
is an unexpected dividend, or if prices rise unexpectedly on news of future dividends.
Table 2 reveals that, using the shock covariance matrix from the data, expected dividend
growth shocks δx and εdp are essentially uncorrelated with ex-post dividend growth shocks δd
and εd, and both are of the same order of magnitude The strong negative correlation between
return and dividend-yield shocks then follows naturally from the fact that the dividend-yield
(or expected dividend growth) shock is part of the return shock in (9) and (12). News of good
expected future dividend growth sends prices up today, raising returns and lowering dividend
yields at the same time. There is no tendency for this correlation to be upset by simultaneous
news about current dividend growth, which would raise returns and dividend yields together.
In sum, if our system is driven by “structural” expected dividend growth and ex-post divi-
dend growth shocks that are essentially uncorrelated, the strong correlation between return and
dividend yield shocks follows naturally and endogenously.
One can give a related “structural” interpretation to the sample estimates. They are con-
sistent with a structure analogous to (10) and (11) in which regression errors reveal shocks
to expected returns and shocks to current dividend growth, with constant expected dividend
growth. The expected-return shock and the dividend-growth shock are essentially uncorrelated
with each other, and the negative correlation between return and dividend yield shocks again
emerges endogenously. This system is set out brieﬂy in Section 6, and in more detail in Cochrane
(2004) Ch. 20.
103 Distribution of regression coeﬃcients and t statistics
3.1 Return and dividend growth forecasts
In each Monte Carlo draw I run regressions
rt+1 = ar + br(dt − pt)+vr
t+1
∆dt+1 = ad + bd(dt − pt)+vd
t+1.
Figure 1 plots the joint distribution of the return and dividend-forecast regression coeﬃcients,
and the joint distribution of their t statistics. Table 3 collects probabilities.
The marginal distribution of the return-forecast coeﬃcient br gives quite weak evidence
against the unforecastable-return null. The Monte Carlo produces a coeﬃcient larger than the
roughly ˆ br ≈ 0.10 sample estimate 22% of the time, and a larger t statistic than the sample
ˆ t =1 .92 about 10% of the time (points to the right of the vertical line in the top panels of
Figure 1, top left entries of Table 3). Taken on its own, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
the return-forecasting coeﬃcient br is zero at the conventional 5% level. This ﬁnding conﬁrms
the results of Goetzmann and Jorion (1993), Nelson and Kim (1993), and Stambaugh (1999).
br tr bd td br,b d br,φ
Real 2 2 . 31 0 . 31 . 7 71 . 6 71 . 7 5 0 . 0 2
Excess 1 7 . 46 . 3 21 . 1 10 . 8 71 . 1 0 0 . 0 1
Table 3. Percent probability values under the φ =0 .941 null. Each column gives
the probability that the indicated coeﬃcients are greater than their sample values,
under the null. Columns with two variables give the probability that both are greater
than their sample values, i.e. br,b d gives the probability that br > ˆ br and bd > ˆ bd.
Monte Carlo simulation of the null described in Table 2 with 50,000 draws.
However, the null must assume that dividend growth is forecastable. As a result, almost all
simulations give a large negative dividend growth forecast coeﬃcient bd. The cloud of Figure 1 is
vertically centered a good deal below zero and below the horizontal line of the sample estimate
ˆ bd. Dividend growth forecasting coeﬃcients larger than the roughly zero values observed in
sample are only seen 1.77% of the time, and the dividend-growth t statistic is only greater than
its roughly zero sample value 1.67% of the time (points above the horizontal lines in Figure 1,
bd and td columns of Table 3). Results are even stronger for excess returns, for which bd > ˆ bd is
only observed 1.11% of the time and the t statistic only 0.87% of the time (Table 3).
This is my central point: the lack of dividend forecastability in the data gives in fact far
stronger statistical evidence against the null than does the presence of return forecastability,
lowering probability values from the 20% range to the 1% range. (I discuss the φ =0 .99 results
in Figure 1 below.)
3.2 The φ view
The return forecast coeﬃcient br, the dividend-yield autocorrelation φ,a n dt h ed i v i d e n dg r o w t h
forecast coeﬃcient bd are related by the approximate identity br =1− ρφ + bd. Therefore, the
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Figure 1: Joint distribution of return and dividend growth forecasting coeﬃcients (left) and
t-statistics (right). The lines and dot give the sample estimates. The triangle gives the null.
1000 simulations are plotted for clarity; each point represents 1/10% probability. Percentages
are the fraction of 50,000 simulations that fall in the indicated quadrants.
same information in the (br,b d) joint distribution is captured in the (br,φ) joint distribution or
the (bd,φ) joint distribution. Recasting the point in the (br,φ) context is especially important
since most articles study return forecastability in a two-variable VAR consisting of returns and
the forecasting variable, leaving the behavior of dividends implicit from identities.
The left-hand panels of Figure 2 plot the joint distribution of (br,φ). We see again that a
high return coeﬃcient br by itself is not so unusual, occurring about 22% of the time (area to the
right of the vertical line). However, high return coeﬃcients br tend to come with low dividend
yield autocorrelations φ. We almost never see a return forecast as high as we do in the data
together with a dividend yield autocorrelation as high as the φ =0 .941 we seen in the data — the
Northeast quadrants are nearly empty. (The left panels of Figure 2 are the same as Lewellen’s
(2004) Figure 1, Panel B except Lewellen calibrates to monthly postwar data. Lewellen focuses
on a diﬀerent distributional calculation.)
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Figure 2: Joint distributions of regression coeﬃcients. Left hand panels give the joint distribution
of br,φ. Right hand panels give the joint distribution of bd,φ. In each graph the triangle marks
the null hypothesis used to generate the data and the circle marks the estimated coeﬃcients
ˆ br,ˆ bd, ˆ φ. The diagonal dashed line marked “bd” in the left hand panels marks the region br =
1 − ρφ + ˆ bd; points above and to the right are draws where bd exceeds its sample value. The
diagonal dashed line marked “br” in the right hand panels marks the region bd = ρφ − 1+ˆ br;
points above and to the left are draws where br exceeds its sample value. Numbers are the
percentage of the draws that fall in the indicated quadrants.
The negative correlation between br and φ estimates, visible in the diagonal spread of points
in Figure 2, is the key to this result. A lower sample value of φ, through the identity br =
1 − ρφ + bd must correspond to a larger sample value of br, a larger sample value of bd, or
both. If the dividend yield seems to revert quickly after a shock in a given sample, then it
must be the case that one of dividend growth or prices and hence returns moves a lot after
the shock, to generate the quick reversion of dividend yields. In fact, lower φ are primarily
largely associated with higher br rather than lower bd. In turn, this fact is driven by the strong
negative correlation between φ and br shocks seen in Table 2. If the shocks in two regressions
are negatively correlated, then a set of shocks that produces an unusually large coeﬃcient in the
13ﬁrst regression corresponds to set of shocks that produces an unusually small coeﬃcient in the
second regression.
To relate the (br,b d) joint distribution with the (br,φ) joint distribution, the diagonal dashed
line marked bd in the top left panel of Figure 2 marks the set br =1− ρφ +ˆ bd where ˆ bd is the
sample estimate. Points above and to the right of this dashed line are exactly the points above
bd > ˆ bd in the (br,b d) distribution of Figure 1. In this way, we can see both joint distributions
((br,b d)a n d( br,φ)) on the same graph.
With both joint distributions on the same graph, we can see that the region (br > ˆ br,φ> ˆ φ)
is in fact more restrictive than the region (br > ˆ br,b>ˆ bd), which is why we see lower probability
values for the (br > ˆ br,φ> ˆ φ)r e g i o n .
More importantly, we see that the region b>ˆ bd (above and to the right of the dashed
diagonal line) captures in a single number the essence of the joint (br,φ) distribution. The point
of the (br,φ) distribution is that samples with large return-forecast coeﬃcient br come with low
dividend yield autocorrelation φ. By the identity bd = br +ρφ−1, such samples come with low
bd, so setting up a rejection region above and to the right of the diagonal bd line captures the
message of the negative correlation between br and φ.
Looking at the (br, φ) system has the advantage that one can make the same distributional
points with an arbitrary right hand variable, one that is not connected to dividend growth via
any identities. However, the strong negative correlation between br and φ estimates visible
in Figure 2 is an important component of the results. In turn, the correlation of estimates
derives from the strong correlation between return and dividend yield shocks seen in Table 2.
As I argued above, that correlation between shocks emerges naturally in dynamic present value
models, since a change in expected return or expected dividend growth gives rise to a price
change that moves both dividend yield and return. An arbitrary right hand variable, especially
one that does not include price, may not produce such a strong correlation.
The right hand panels of Figure 2 complete the trio of views by plotting the joint distribution
of dividend growth and dividend yield forecasting coeﬃcients (bd,φ). There is no particular
correlation between the two coeﬃcients in this case, resulting from the near-zero correlation
between dividend growth and dividend yield shocks, as seen in Table 2. The cloud is smeared
to the left however. The distribution of bd conditional on a given φ (vertical slices) becomes more
spread out for lower φ, as one moves to the left The leftward smear of the cloud relative to the
null (triangle) comes from the downward bias and large left tail of autocorrelation φ estimates.
Thus, though the unconditional chance of seeing a dividend growth forecast as high as in the
data (above the horizontal line) is already low, there are almost no observations in the Northeast
corner, where we see a large dividend growth forecast and high sample autocorrelation.
4 Long-horizon coeﬃcients
4.1 A long-run identity










14The second row deﬁnes notation. Casting the problem in terms of these coeﬃcients simpliﬁes
and clariﬁes the analysis considerably.
The terms of identity (13) have useful interpretations. First, blr
r is the regression coeﬃcient
of long-run returns
P∞
j=1 ρj−1rt+j on dividend yields dt − pt,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rblr
d (hence the
lr superscript). Second, blr
r and −blr
d represent the fraction of the variance of dividend yields
that can be attributed to time-varying expected returns and to time-varying expected dividend
growth, respectively.
To see these interpretations, iterate the return identity (6) forward, giving the Campbell-
Shiller (1988) present value identity




















ρj−1∆dt+j,d t − pt
⎞
⎠. (15)
This equation states that all variation in the dividend-price ratio must be accounted for by its
covariance with, and thus ability to forecast, future returns or future dividend growth. Dividing













ρj−1∆dt+j,d t − pt
⎞
⎠ = 1 (16)
where β(y,x) denotes the regression coeﬃcient of y on x. In the context of our simple VAR(1)



















and similarly for dividend growth.
Negative blr
d is the fraction of dividend-yield volatility due to dividend growth, since if high
prices and a low dividend yield signal higher future dividends, then blr
d and bd are negative.
If a high dividend yield instead means higher dividend growth, expected returns must move
even further to explain the movement in dividend yield, thus explaining “more than 100%” of
dividend yield variation. More than 100% and less than zero are therefore possible. This is not
a decomposition into orthogonal components. This sort of calculation is the standard way to
adapt the ideas of Shiller’s (1981) and LeRoy and Porter’s (1981) volatility tests to the fact that
dividend yields rather than price levels are stationary. See Campbell and Shiller (1988) and
Cochrane (1991), (1992), (2004) for more details.








This equation expresses the same ideas in another way. br−bd is the total amount of predictability
we see in the data. Returns or dividends must be forecastable to pull the dividend yield back
15after a shock, and the faster it reverts (lower φ), the larger br and −bd must be. The two terms
then capture how much of the needed overall predictability br −bd is in returns (ﬁrst term) and
h o wm u c hi si nd i v i d e n dg r o w t h( s e c o n dt e r m ) .
4.2 Long-run estimates and tests
Table 4 presents estimates of the long-horizon regression coeﬃcients. These are not new esti-
mates, they are simply calculations based on the OLS estimates ˆ br,ˆ bd, ˆ φ in Table 2. I calcu-
late standard errors using the delta-method and the heteroskedasticity-corrected OLS standard
errors6 in Table 2.
Variable ˆ blr s. e. t % p value
r 1.09 0.44 2.48 1.39-1.83
∆d 0.09 0.44 2.48 1.39-1.83
Excess r 1.23 0.47 2.62 0.47-0.69
Table 4. Long-run regression coeﬃcients. The long-run return forecast coeﬃcient
ˆ blr
r is computed as ˆ blr
r = ˆ br/(1−ρˆ φ)w h e r eˆ br is the regression coeﬃcient of one year
returns rt+1 on dt−pt, ˆ φ is the autocorrelation of dt−pt, ρ =0 .961, and similarly for
t h el o n g - r u nd i v i d e n dg r o w t hf o r e c a s tc o e ﬃcient ˆ blr
d . The standard error is calculated
from standard errors for ˆ br and ˆ φ by the delta method. The t statistic for ∆d is
the statistic for the hypothesis ˆ blr
d = −1. Percent probability values (% p value)
are generated by Monte Carlo under the φ =0 .941 null. The range of probability
values is given over the three choices of which coeﬃcient (ˆ br, ˆ φ, ˆ bd)i si m p l i e df r o m
the other two.
Table 4 shows that dividend yield volatility is almost exactly accounted for entirely by return
forecasts, ˆ blr
r ≈ 1, with essentially no contribution from dividend growth forecasts ˆ blr
d ≈ 0. This
is another sense in which the return forecasting coeﬃcient is highly economically signiﬁcant.
This ﬁnding is a simple consequence of the familiar estimates. ˆ bd ≈ 0m e a n sˆ blr





1 − ρˆ φ
≈
0.10
1 − 0.96 × 0.94
≈ 1.0.
In fact, the point estimates in Table 4 show slightly more than 100% of dividend-yield volatility
coming from returns, since the point estimate of dividend growth forecasts go slightly the wrong



























































































































16way. Excess returns in the last row of Table 4 show slightly stronger results. High prices-dividend
ratios actually signal slightly higher interest rates, so they signal even lower excess returns.
The ﬁr s tt w or o w so fT a b l e4d r i v eh o m et h ef a c tt h a t ,b yt h ei d e n t i t yblr
r −blr
d = 1, the long-
horizon dividend growth regression gives exactly the same results as the long-horizon return
regression.7 The standard errors are also exactly the same, and the t statistic for blr
r =0i s
exactly the same as the t statistic for blr
d = −1. Using the long-horizon regression coeﬃcients,
we do not need to choose between return and dividend-growth tests.










Figure 3: Distribution of br/(1−ρφ). The vertical bar gives the corresponding value in the data.
Figure 3 tabulates the small-sample distribution of the long-run return-forecast estimates,
and Table 4 includes the probability values, i.e. how many long-run return forecasts are greater
than the sample value under the unforecastable-return null br
lr =0 . B yt h ei d e n t i t yblr
r −blr
d =1 ,
these are the same as how many long-run dividend growth forecasts are greater than the sample
value under the null bd
lr = −1. There is about a 1.5% probability value of seeing a long-run
return forecast blr
r larger than seen in the data, or a long run dividend growth forecast blr
d larger
than seen in the data. (The range of probability values in Table 4 derives from the fact that
the identities are only approximate, so the result depends on which of the three parameters
(br,φ,b d) is implied from the other two.) Comparing this 1.5% probability value to the 22%
or so probability values for br > ˆ br, we see that the long-run coeﬃcient incorporates the joint
information in returns and dividend growth, or returns and dividend-yield autocorrelation, in
a single number.
Speciﬁcally, we saw in Figure 2 that br is large predominantly in samples in which φ is low.
When φ is low, however, blr
r = br/(1−ρφ) is not so large. Thus, the long-run coeﬃcient captures
7The identities are only approximate, so to display estimates that obey the identities one must estimate two
of br, bd,a n dφ, imply the other using the identity br − bd =1− ρφ.I nt h et o pt w ol i n e so fT a b l e4 ,Iu s et h e
direct ˆ br and ˆ bd estimates from Table 2. I then use ρˆ φimpl =1− ˆ br + ˆ bd and I construct long run estimates by
ˆ b
lr
r = ˆ br/(1−ρˆ φimpl). Since ˆ φ =0 .94 and ˆ φimpl =0 .95, the diﬀerence between these estimates and estimates that
use ˆ φ is very small. Using the direct estimate ˆ φ rather than ˆ φimpl,w eh a v eˆ b
lr




17in a single number the point of the joint br,φdistribution of Figure 2, that we seldom see high
br without also seeing low φ.
Similarly, we saw in Figure 1 that large br usually come with small (large negative) bd.I n
the context of the identity (18), the long-run regression coeﬃcient is blr
r = br/(br −bd). Large br
that also come with large negative bd count less in blr
r , so testing the long-run coeﬃcient captures
the point of the joint (br,b d) distribution in a single number.
The last row of Table 4 shows the results for excess returns. Again, excess returns paint a
stronger picture. The probability values of 0.38% - 0.64% for the test blr
r = 0 are correspondingly
lower and the evidence against the null even stronger.
4.3 The advantages of long-run coeﬃcients
Recasting the problem in terms of the long-run coeﬃcients blr
r and blr
d provides an elegant
way to characterize the null and alternative. In particular, the long-run coeﬃcients solve the
arbitrariness of the joint regions for br and bd,o rbr and φ, by boiling them down to a single
number, and they capture the null and alternative in the cleanest way.
Boiling a joint distribution down to a single test statistic is always troublesome. Should we
test br > ˆ br, or should we test bd > ˆ bd? Or perhaps we should test some other subset of the
(br,b d)r e g i o n ,o rt h e( br,φ) region? Certainly the joint probabilities (br > ˆ br, φ>ˆ φ)g ot o o
far. I present them as interesting characterizations of the joint distribution, but one would not
likely set up a test region in the Northeast quadrants, since one would not likely commit to
accepting the null outside that quadrant, i.e. with an arbitrarily large br but bd or φ just below
some cutoﬀ.
The issue comes down to deﬁning what is the “event” we have seen, and what other events
we would consider “more extreme,” and so should count as being further out in the tail. Here,
the long-run coeﬃcients neatly solve the conundrums posed by the joint distribution of short-run
coeﬃcients.
We conventionally think of the “event” as the return forecast coeﬃcient seen in the data
br = ˆ br ≈ 0.1, and “more extreme” events as those with greater one-year return-forecast coeﬃ-
cients, br > ˆ br. But, as the joint distributions point out, most of the events with return-forecast
coeﬃcients greater than those seen in the data, br > ˆ br, have dividend-growth forecast coeﬃ-
cients lower than seen in the data, bd < ˆ bd, or dividend-yield autocorrelations lower than seen
in the data φ<ˆ φ. In these events, dividend growth is forecastable and does count for a
portion of dividend yield variation. Are these really “more extreme” events, further from the
unpredictable-return null than what we have seen in our data? Or, should we instead count such
events, on full inspection, as being closer to the null than the event in our data? For example,
if our data showed ˆ br =0 .2, but volatility tests were a half success, ﬁnding half of dividend yield
variance due to dividend growth forecasts, rather than the dismal failure they are in our data,
would we not think of ourselves as closer to the null than we are now? That is how the long-run
coeﬃcients count things. For similar reasons, blr
d = −1 is a more useful statement of the null
than is bd = −0.1.
The long-run coeﬃcients also solve the seeming arbitrariness of which joint distribution one
chooses to look at. Since the long-run coeﬃcients obey the identities (13) and (18), there is
no diﬀerence whether we think in terms of return coeﬃcients, dividend coeﬃcients, or joint
properties of returns br, dividends bd or dividend-yields φ. Every statistic or pair of variables
18gives exactly the same answer.
The long-run coeﬃcients seem to give the same answer as the test on dividend-growth coeﬃ-
cients alone, bd > ˆ bd. In fact they are diﬀerent conceptually and slightly diﬀerent in this sample.
The long-run coeﬃcient test blr
d > ˆ blr
d means bd/(1−ρφ) > ˆ bd(1−ρˆ φ). If we had ˆ bd = 0 exactly,
these two events would be the same. With ˆ bd 6=0 ,ad i ﬀerent sample φ can aﬀect the long-run
dividend growth coeﬃcient blr
d , perhaps pushing it across a boundary, for the same value of the
short-run dividend growth coeﬃcient bd. It is the fact that ˆ bd is so close to zero that makes
the results and intuition (regions in the joint distribution regions) so similar between bd and
long-run tests in our data.
5 Autocorrelation φ, unit roots, bubbles, and priors
So far I have used the sample value of the dividend yield autocorrelation φ =0 .941 to generate
the Monte Carlo. One naturally wants to know how the results are aﬀected by the choice of φ,
and especially by larger values of φ, given the downward bias in autocorrelation estimates.
5.1 Results for diﬀerent φ values
Table 5 collects probability values for various events as a function of φ. The previous ﬁgures
include the case φ =0 .99.
Percent probability values Statistics
Null Real Returns Excess returns
φ br bd br,φ b lr
min blr
max br bd br,φ b lr
min blr
max σ(dp) 1/2 life
0.90 24 0.6 0.00 0.3 0.6 19 0.4 0.00 0.1 0.2 0.35 6.6
0.941 22 1.6 0.06 1.2 1.7 17 1.1 0.01 0.5 0.7 0.45 11.4
0.96 22 2.6 0.08 2.0 2.8 17 1.6 0.06 0.8 1.2 0.55 17.0
0.98 21 4.9 0.4 4.3 5.5 17 2.7 0.2 1.8 2.5 0.77 34.3
0.99 21 6.3 0.8 5.9 7.4 17 3.6 0.3 2.7 3.6 1.09 69.0
1.00 22 8.7 1.0 8.1 10 16 4.4 0.5 3.7 4.8 ∞∞
1.01 19 11 1.5 11 13 14 5.1 0.6 5.1 6.3 ∞∞
Draw φ 23 1.6 0.1 1.4 1.7 18 1.1 0.04 0.6 0.8
Table 5. The eﬀects of dividend-yield autocorrelation φ.T h eﬁrst column gives
the assumed value of φ.“ D r a w φ”d r a w sφ from the concentrated unconditional
likelihood function displayed in Figure 4. “Percent probability values” give the per-
cent chance of seeing each statistic larger than the sample value. br is the return
forecasting coeﬃcient, bd is the dividend growth forecasting coeﬃcient. br,φ gives
the chance of seeing both statistics greater than their data counterparts. blr is the
long-run regression coeﬃcient, e.g. blr
r = br/(1−ρφ). blr
min and blr
max are the smallest
and largest values across the three ways of calculating the sample value of br/(1−ρφ),
depending on which coeﬃcient is implied by the identity br =1− ρφ + bd. σ(dp)
gives the implied standard deviation of the dividend yield σ(dp)=σε,dp/
p
1 − φ2.
Half life is the value of τ such that φτ =1 /2.
19As φ rises, the identity bd = br + ρφ − 1 requires larger (less negative) dividend-growth
coeﬃcients bd i nt h en u l lt og oa l o n gw i t hbr =0 .A tt h es a m p l eφ =0 .941, we needed bd ≈− 0.1
to go along with br =0 .A sφ rises to φ = 1, for example, we only need bd = ρ−1 ≈− 0.04. As
the null bd rises, the chance of seeing values greater than in the data, bd > ˆ bd, naturally rises.
This behavior is clear comparing the top and bottom panels of Figure 1. Raising φ and thus
raising bd in the null raises the triangle representing the null. The cloud of simulation points
rises, so the chance of seeing bd > ˆ bd above the horizontal line rises as well. However, the cloud
doesn’t rise much, and its shape is changed reﬂecting more severe small-sample biases. Looking
down the bd column of Table 5, the bd > ˆ bd probability for real returns crosses the 5% mark a
bit above φ =0 .98 and is still below 10% at φ = 1. Excess returns are stronger as usual, with
the bd probability value still below 5% at φ = 1. In all cases, the dividend-growth test bd still
has more information, with less than half the probability value of the return-forecast br region.
As the null rises in Figure 1, the simulation points do not move much to the left or right.
Therefore, raising φ has little eﬀect on the br statistic, which is about 22% for all values of φ in
Table 5.
The joint distributions of Figure 2 and the corresponding Northeast-quadrant probability
values br,φ in Table 5 show a similar pattern. In the (br,φ) distribution, raising φ raises the
null triangle, raising the cloud of points somewhat. The increased downward bias in φ works
against this rise however, as the cloud of points does not rise one for one with the triangle null.
The probability values of the long-run coeﬃcients blr = b/(1−ρφ) also rise with φ as shown
in Table 5. These probability values cross the 5% line at about φ =0 .98 for real returns, and
stay below 5% all the way to φ = 1 for excess returns. The evidence from the long-horizon
coeﬃcients is again stronger than the one-period coeﬃcient br evidence at any φ.
5.2 What’s the right φ?
One can simply stop at Table 5 and catalog the probability values as a function of the assumed
null φ. But it’s natural to think a bit about how large a value of φ we should consider, and thus
how strong the evidence really is.
We can start by ruling out φ>1/ρ ≈ 1.04, since this case implies an inﬁnite price-dividend
ratio, and we observe ﬁnite values. The forward iteration used to derive the present value
relation (28) from the return identity (6) is






ρj−1rt+j +l i m
k→∞
ρkEt (pt+k − dt+k) (19)
In our VAR(1) model, the last term is ρkφk (pt − dt), and it explodes if φ>1/ρ.
If we have φ =1 /ρ ≈ 1.04, then it seems we can adopt a null with both br =0a n dbd =0 ,





j=1 ρj−1φj−1br(dt − pt) do not converge. This is the case of “rational
bubble.” If φ =1 /ρ exactly, then price-dividend ratios vary on changing expectations of their
future values, the last term of Equation (19), with no news at all about dividends or expected
returns. This view is hard to hold as a matter of economic theory, so I rule it out on that basis.
(Since I will argue against any φ ≥ 1, it doesn’t make sense to spend a lot of time on a review
of the rational bubbles literature to rule out φ =1 .04.)
20At φ = 1, the dividend yield follows a random walk. φ = 1 still implies some predictability
of returns or dividend growth, br +bd =1−ρφ ≈ 0.04. If prices and dividends are not expected
to move after a dividend yield rise, the higher dividend yield still means more dividends and
thus a higher return. φ = 1 does not cause trouble for the present value model; φ =1i st h e
point at which the statistical model explodes to an inﬁnite unconditional variance.
Can we seriously consider a unit root in dividend yields? The dividend yield does pass
standard unit root tests (Craine 1993), but with ˆ φ =0 .941 that statistical evidence will naturally
be tenuous. In my simulations with φ =1 ,t h eo b s e r v e dˆ φ =0 .941 is almost exactly the median
value, so we do not reject φ = 1 on that basis.
Long-run evidence argues better against a random walk for the dividend yield. Stocks have
been trading since the 1600s, giving spotty observations of prices and dividends, and privately
held businesses and partnerships have been valued for a millennium. A random walk in dividend
yields generates far more variation than we have seen in that time. Using the measured 15%
innovation variance of the dividend yield, and starting at a price/dividend ratio of 25 (1/0.04),
the one-century one-standard deviation band — looking backwards as well as forwards — is a
price-dividend ratio between8 5.6 and 112, and the ±2 standard deviation band is between9
1.24 and 502. In 300 years, the bands are ±1σ =( 1 .9 − 336), and ±2σ =( 0 .14 − 4514). If
dividend yields really follow a random walk, we should have seen observations of this sort. But
market price-dividend ratios of two or three hundred have never been approached, let alone
price-dividend ratios below one or over a thousand.
Looking forward, and as a matter of economics, do we really believe that dividend yields will
wander arbitrarily far in either the positive or negative direction? Are we fairly likely to see a
market price-dividend ratio of one, or one thousand, in the next century or two? These points
are mirrored in the inﬁnite unconditional variance of the dividend yield tabulated in Table 5.
Having argued against φ = 1, how close to one should we seriously consider as a null for φ?
Neither the statistical nor the economic arguments against φ = 1 rest on an exact random walk
in dividend yields. Both arguments center on the conditional variance of the price-dividend ratio
over centuries, and φ =0 .999 or φ =1 .001 generate about the same magnitudes as φ =1 .000.
Thus, if φ =1 .00 is too large to swallow, there is some range of φ below one that is also too
large to swallow. To get a handle on this question, Table 5 also includes the unconditional
variance of dividend yields and the half-life of dividend yields implied by the assumed φ.T h e
sample estimate ˆ φ =0 .941 is consistent with the sample standard deviation of σ(dp)=0 .45,
and a 11.4 year half-life of dividend-yield ﬂuctuations. In the φ =0 .99 null, the standard
deviation of log dividend yields is actually 1.14, more than twice the volatility that has caused
so much consternation in our sample, and the half-life of market swings is in reality 69 years;
two generations rather than two business cycles. These numbers seems to me a good deal larger
than any sensible view of the world.
However, nothing dramatic happens as φ rises from 0.98 to 1.01, so one may take any upper
limit in this range without changing the conclusions dramatically. And that conclusion remains
a rejection of the null that returns are unpredictable, with the consequence that dividend growth















215.3 An overall number
It would be nice to present a single number, rather than a table of values as a function of an
assumed value for the dividend-yield autocorrelation φ. We can do this by integrating over φ with
a prior distribution. The last row of Table 5 presents this calculation, using the unconditional
likelihood of φ as the integrating distribution.
Figure 4 presents the likelihood function for φ. This is simply the likelihood function of
an AR(1) process ﬁt to the dividend yield, with the intercept and error variance parameters
maximized out. Details are in the Appendix. The conditional likelihood takes the ﬁrst data
point as ﬁxed. The unconditional likelihood adds the log probability of the ﬁrst datapoint, using
its unconditional density. As Figure 4 shows, the conditional and unconditional likelihoods have
pretty much the same shape. The unconditional likelihood goes to zero at φ =1 ,w h i c hi st h e
boundary of stationarity in levels. The maximum unconditional likelihood is only very slightly
below the maximum conditional likelihood and OLS estimate of φ.














Figure 4: Likelihood function for φ, the autoregressive parameter for dividend yields. The
l i k e l i h o o di sb a s e do na na u t o r e g r e s s i v em o d e l ,dt+1 − pt+1 = adp + φ(dt − pt)+ε
dp
t+1.T h e
intercept adp and innovation variance σ2(εdp) are maximized out.
I repeat the simulation, but this time drawing φ from the unconditional likelihood plotted
in Figure 4 before drawing a sample of errors ε
dp
t and εd
t. I use the unconditional likelihood in
order to impose the view that dividend yields are stationary with a ﬁnite variance, φ<1, and
to avoid any draws in the region φ>1/ρ ≈ 1.04 where present value formulas blow up.
T h el a s tr o wo fT a b l e5s u m m a r i z e st h er e s u l t s . T h er e s u l t sa r eq u i t es i m i l a rt ot h eφ =
0.941 case. This happens because the likelihood function is reasonably symmetric around the
maximum likelihood estimate, and our statistics are not strongly nonlinear functions of φ.I f
something blew up as φ → 1, for example, then we could see an important diﬀerence between
results for a ﬁxed φ =0 .941 and this calculation. Most importantly, rather than a 23% chance
of seeing a return-forecasting coeﬃcient br > ˆ br, we can reject the null based on a 1.6% chance
of seeing a dividend-growth forecast bd > ˆ bd or the 1.4% - 1.7% chance of seeing the more
elegant long-run regression coeﬃcients blr
r or blr
d greater than their sample values. As usual,
22excess returns give even stronger rejections, with bd > ˆ bd occurring only 1.1% of the time,
and the long-run coeﬃcient blr
r only exceeding its sample value ˆ blr
r 0.6% - 0.8% of the time.
(Lewellen 2004 presents a similar and more formally Bayesian calculation that also delivers
small probability values.)
5.4 Bias in forecast estimates
Table 6 presents the means of the estimated coeﬃcients under the null hypothesis. As we
expect for a near-unit-root process, the dividend yield autocorrelation estimate φ is biased
downward. The return forecast coeﬃcient br is biased upward. The bias of approximately 0.05
accounts for roughly half of the sample estimate ˆ br ≈ 0.10. This bias results from the strong
negative correlation between return and dividend-yield errors and the consequent strong negative
correlation between return and dividend-yield coeﬃcients.
The dividend-growth coeﬃcient bd is not biased. As seen in Figure 2, there is no particular
correlation between the bd and φ estimates, again deriving from the nearly zero correlation
between dividend growth and dividend yield shocks. Thus, the dividend growth forecast does not
inherit any near-unit-root issues from the strong autocorrelation of the right hand variable. This
observation should give a little more comfort to the result that bd ≈ 0 is a good characterization
of the data.
The long-horizon return coeﬃcient blr
r is biased up, and more so for higher values of φ.
Correspondingly, the long-horizon dividend growth coeﬃcient blr
d is biased up as well. However,
the strong rejections of blr
r = 0 or equivalently blr
d = −1 mean that we can still distinguish the
biased value blr
r =0 .24 − 0.43 from the sample value ˆ blr
r ≈ 1.
br bd φb lr
r blr
d
φ =0 .941 Null 0 -0.093 0.941 0 -1
Mean 0.049 -0.097 0.886 0.24 -0.77
φ =0 .99 Null 0 -0.046 0.990 0 -1
Mean 0.057 -0.050 0.926 0.43 -0.57
Table 6. Means of estimated parameters. Means are taken over 50,000 simulations
of the Monte Carlo described in Table 2.
6O u t - o f - s a m p l e R 2
Goyal and Welch (2005) show in a comprehensive study that the dividend yield and many other
regressors thought to forecast returns do not do so out of sample. They compare two return-
forecasting strategies. First, run a regression rt+1 = a + bxt + εt+1 f r o mt i m e1t ot i m eτ,a n d
use ˆ a+ˆ bxτ to forecast the return at time τ +1. Second, compute the sample mean return from
t i m e1t ot i m eτ, and use that sample mean to forecast the return at time τ + 1. Goyal and
Welch compare the mean squared error of the two strategies, and ﬁnd that the “out-of-sample”
mean squared error is larger for the return forecast than for the sample mean.
Campbell and Thompson (2005) give a partial rejoinder. The heart of the Goyal-Welch
low R2 is that the coeﬃcients a and b are poorly estimated in “short” samples. In particular,
sample estimates often put conditional expected excess returns less than zero, and recommend
23a short position. Campbell and Thompson rule out such “implausible” estimates, and ﬁnd out-
of-sample R2 that are a bit better than the unconditional mean. Goyal and Welch respond that
the out-of-sample R2 are still tiny.
6.1 Out of sample R2 as a test
Does this result mean that “returns are really not forecastable?” If all dividend yield variation
was really due to return forecasts, how often would we see Goyal-Welch results? To answer this
question, I set up the analogous null in which returns are forecastable and dividend growth is
not forecastable, and all dividend-yield variation comes from time-varying expected returns. Let
expected returns vary through time,
Et(rt+1)=xt+1 = φxt − δx
t+1.
(The sign of δ is arbitrary. With a negative sign, a positive δ shock raises the ex-post return,




Imposing the Campbell-Shiller identity (28), we have







































This is exactly the same VAR as before but with a 1 − ρφ in the return forecast slot rather
than zero, and (not shown) zero in the dividend-growth forecast slot rather than ρφ − 1. The
dividend yield regression error reveals shocks to expected returns; the dividend growth error is
the second shock, and the return shock combines those two “structural” shocks. (See Cochrane
2004 Ch. 20 for more details.)
Is i m u l a t ea r t i ﬁcial data from this null as before. I start with φ =0 .941, which gives the
sample return-forecasting coeﬃcient br =1− ρφ ≈ 0.1. I also consider φ =0 .99 to address
small-sample bias worries, which implies a lower value of br =1−ρφ ≈ 0.05. In each sample, I
calculate the Goyal-Welch statistic: I start in year 20, and I compute the diﬀerence between root
mean squared error from the sample-mean forecast and from the ﬁtted dividend yield forecast.
A larger positive value for this statistic is good for return forecastability, larger negative values
mean the sample mean is winning.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of this statistic across simulations. In the data, marked by
the vertical “Data” line, the statistic is negative; the sample mean is a better forecast than
24the dividend yield, as Goyal and Welch ﬁnd. However, 30-40% of the draws show even worse
results than our sample. In these cases, even though all dividend-price variation is due to time-
varying expected returns by construction, the dividend yield is an even worse “out of sample”
forecaster than it is in the observed data. In fact, the mean of the Goyal-Welch statistic is
negative, and only about 20% of the draws show a positive value. Under this null, it is unusual
for dividend-yield forecasting actually to work better than the sample mean in this out-of-sample
experiment.










Figure 5: Distribution of the Goyal-Welch statistic under the null that returns are forecastable
and dividend growth is not forecastable. The statistic is the root mean squared error from using
the sample mean return from time 1 to time t to forecast returns at t + 1, less the root mean
squared error from using a dividend yield regression from time 1 to time t to forecast returns at
time t +1 .
Thus, the Goyal-Welch statistic does not reject the time-varying expected return null. Poor
out-of-sample R2 is exactly what we expect given the persistence of the dividend yield, and the
relatively short samples we have for estimating the relation between dividend yields and returns.
6.2 Reconciliation
Both views are right. Goyal and Welch’s message is that regressions on dividend yields and
similarly persistent variables are not likely to be useful in forming market-timing portfolios,
given the diﬃculty of accurately estimating the return-forecasting coeﬃcients in our “short”
data sample. This conclusion echoes Kandel and Stambaugh (1996) and Barberis (2000), who
show in a Bayesian setting that uncertainty about the parameter br means one should use a much
lower parameter in a market-timing portfolio, shading the portfolio advice well back towards
simple use of the sample mean. (How these more sophisticated calculations perform out of
sample, extending Campbell and Thompson’s 2005 idea, is an interesting open question.)
However, poor out-of-sample R2 does not reject the null hypothesis that returns are pre-
25dictable. Out-of-sample R2 is a diagnostic,n o tatest.O u t - o f - s a m p l e R2 is not a new and
powerful statistic that gives stronger evidence about return forecastability than the regression
coeﬃcients or other standard hypothesis tests. One can simultaneously hold the view that re-
turns are predictable, or more accurately that the bulk of price-dividend ratio movements reﬂect
return forecasts rather than dividend growth forecasts, and believe that such forecasts are not
very useful for out-of-sample portfolio advice, given uncertainties about the coeﬃcients in our
data sets.
7 Power in long-run regression coeﬃcients?
I ﬁnd much greater ability to reject the unforecastable-return null in the long-horizon coeﬃcient
blr
r = br/(1 − ρφ) than in the one-year coeﬃcient br. How can we reconcile this result with the
ﬁndings of the literature such as Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2006), that ﬁnds no
power advantage10 in long-horizon regressions?
7.1 Long-horizon regressions compared
T h e r ea r et h r e em a i nd i ﬀerences between the coeﬃcients that I have calculated and typical long-
horizon regressions. First, blr
r is an inﬁnite-horizon coeﬃcient. It corresponds to the regression
of
P∞
j=1 ρj−1rt+j on dt−pt. Most studies examine instead the power of ﬁnite-horizon regression
coeﬃcients,
Pk
j=1 ρj−1rt+j on dt − pt. Second, blr
r = br/(1 − ρφ)i simplied from the ﬁrst-order
VAR. Most studies examine instead direct regression coeﬃcients, i.e. they actually construct Pk
j=1 ρj−1rt+j and explicitly run it on dt − pt.T h i r d , blr
r is weighted by ρ where most studies
examine instead unweighted returns, i.e.
Pk
j=1 rt+j on dt − pt.
To ﬁnd out which of these three diﬀerences in technique accounts for the diﬀerence in results,
Table 7 evaluates long-horizon regressions. The ﬁrst row of Table 7 presents the familiar one-
year return forecast. We see the usual coeﬃcient of ˆ br =0 .10, with 22 percent probability value
of observing a larger coeﬃcient under the null.
I n c r e a s i n gt oa5y e a rh o r i z o n ,w es e et h a tt h er e g r e s s i o nc o e ﬃcient rises substantially, to 0.35-
0.43, depending on which method one uses. In the direct estimates, the probability values get
slightly worse, rising to 28 - 29% of seeing a larger value. I therefore conﬁrm here ﬁndings such
as Boudoukh Richardson and Whitelaw’s (2006) that directly-estimated long-horizon regressions
do not improve power over one-period regressions. The implied 5 year regression coeﬃcients do
a little bit better, with probability values declining to 16-18%. The improvement is small,
however, and looking only at 1-5 year horizons, one might well conclude that long-horizon
regressions can have some, but only a little additional power.
As we increase horizon, however, the probability values decrease substantially. The implied
long-horizon regression coeﬃcients reach 5% probability values at horizons between 15 and 20
years under φ =0 .94, and there are still important gains in power going past the 20 year horizon.
10Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw focus much of their discussion on the high correlation of short and
long-term regression coeﬃcients. This is an interesting, but tangential point. Short and long-horizon coeﬃcients
are not perfectly correlated, so long-horizon regressions add some information. The only issue is how much, i.e.
power to reject the null hypothesis.
26Weighted Unweighted
Pk
j=1 ρj−1rt+j = a + b
(k)
r (dt − pt)+δt+k
Pk
j=1 rt+j = a + b
(k)
r (dt − pt)+δt+k
direct implied direct implied
coeﬀ.p - v a l u e , φ = coeﬀ.p - v a l u e , φ = coeﬀ.p - v a l u e , φ = coeﬀ.p - v a l u e , φ =
k b
(k)
r 0.94 0.99 b
(k)
r 0.94 0.99 b
(k)
r 0.94 0.99 b
(k)
r 0.94 0.99
1 0.10 22 22 0.10 22 22 0.10 22 22 0.10 22 22
5 0.35 28 29 0.40 17 19 0.37 29 29 0.43 16 18
10 0.80 16 16 0.65 10 15 0.92 16 16 1.02 9.0 14
15 1.38 4.4 4.7 0.80 6.2 12 1.68 4.8 5.0 1.26 4.3 10
20 1.49 4.7 5.2 0.89 4.1 9.8 1.78 7.8 8.3 1.41 2.2 7.6
∞ 1.04 1.8 7.3 1.64 0.5 8.9
Table 7. Long-horizon forecasting regressions. In each case b
(k)
r gives the point
estimate in the data. “p-value” gives the percent probability value, i.e. the percent-
age of simulations in which the long-horizon regression coeﬃcient b
(k)
r exceeded the
sample value ˆ b
(k)
r . φ =0 .94,0.99 gives results for the two assumptions on dividend
yield autocorrelation φ in the null hypothesis. “Direct” constructs long-horizon re-
turns and explicitly runs them on dividend yields. “Implied” calculates the indicated
long-horizon regression coeﬃcient from one-period regression coeﬃcients. For exam-





(1 − ρ5φ5)/(1 − ρφ)br.
Thus, Table 7 shows that the central question is the horizon: conventional 5 and even 10
year horizons do not go far enough out to see the power advantages of long horizon regressions.
To understand why long horizons help and why we need such long horizons, consider two and
three-year return regressions
rt+1 + ρrt+2 = a(2)
r + b(2)
r xt + δt+2,
rt+1 + ρrt+2 + ρ2rt+3 = a(3)
r + b(3)
r xt + δt+3.
The coeﬃcients are (in population, or in the indirect estimate)
b(3)
r = br(1 + ρφ) (21)
b(3)
r = br(1 + ρφ + ρ2φ2). (22)
Thus, coeﬃcients rise with horizon mechanically as a result of one-period forecastability and the
autocorrelation φ of the forecasting variable (Campbell and Shiller 1991).
If we had a sample with a br a sl a r g ea sw es e ei nt h ed a t a ,b u tw i t haφ smaller than we see
in the data, then (21) and (22) show that we would not see as large long-horizon coeﬃcients as
we do in the data. Since large br t e n dt oc o m ew i t hs m a l lφ, as seen in Figure 2, it is therefore
much harder for the null to produce large long-horizon coeﬃcients than it is for the null to
produce large one-year coeﬃcients. Long-horizon coeﬃcients exploit the joint distribution of br
and φ to increase power against the null.
The trouble is that this mechanism is not quantitatively strong for two, three, or even ﬁve
year horizons, as their particular combinations of br and φ do not stress φ enough. To display
this fact, Figure 6 plots again the joint distribution of (br,φ), together with lines that show
27rejection regions for long-horizon regression coeﬃcients. The one-year horizon line is vertical
line as before; the large number of points to the right of this line constitute the 22% probability
value of the one-year regression. The 5 year horizon line is the set of (br,φ)p o i n t sa tw h i c h
br(1 + ρφ + .. + ρ4φ4)=ˆ br(1 + ρˆ φ + .. + ρ4ˆ φ4)w h e r eˆ br and ˆ φ are sample estimates. Points
above and to the right of this line are simulations in which the ﬁve-year (unweighted, implied)
regression coeﬃcient is larger than the sample value of this coeﬃcient. The k = ∞ line is the
set of (br,φ)p o i n t sa tw h i c hbr/(1 − ρφ)=ˆ br/(1 − ρˆ φ); points above and to the right of this
line are simulations in which the inﬁnite-horizon long-run regression coeﬃcients studied above
are greater than their sample values.
As the ﬁgure shows, longer horizon regressions give more and more weight to φ.T h e y
therefore exclude more and more of the points that produce one-year coeﬃcients br larger than
seen in the sample, but together with dividend yield autocorrelation φ less than seen in the
sample. The Figure shows clearly why one must consider such long horizons to exclude many
points.









r and φ, with long run regressions 
 1  5 10 20 ∞
∞, unweighted
Figure 6: Joint distribution of br and φ estimates, together with regions implied by lonng-run
regressions. The lines give the rejection regions implied by long-horizon return regressions at
the indicated yearly horizon. For example, the points above and to the right of the line marked
“2” are simulations in which coeﬃcient b
(5)
r =( 1+ρφ + ... + ρ4φ4)br is higher than the value
ˆ b
(5)
r =( 1+ρˆ φ + ... + ρ4ˆ φ4)ˆ br in the data. The dashed line marked “∞, unweighted” plots the
line where br/(1−φ)=ˆ br/(1−ρˆ φ) corresponding to the inﬁnite-horizon unweighted regression.
7.2 Implications and non-implications
Table 7 shows that the distinction between weighted and unweighted long-horizon regressions
makes little diﬀerence. Since ρ =0 .96 is close to one, that result is not surprising. Yes, the
implied inﬁnite-horizon unweighted regression coeﬃcient does make sense. Even though the left
hand variable and its variance explode, the coeﬃcient converges to the ﬁnite value br/(1 − φ).
Unweighted regressions value φ a little more than weighted regressions, producing a slightly
quicker move to larger power.
28Table 7 shows some interesting diﬀerences between implied and direct estimates, though the
choice of horizon remains the biggest inﬂuence on power. In most cases, the direct estimates
give less power against the null than the implied estimates. At a 5 year horizon, this degradation
is enough that the direct estimates give less power than the 1 year horizon estimates, while the
5-year implied estimates show an improvement over the 1 year estimates. In a few cases, the
direct estimates seem to better than the indirect estimates. However, this is a result of larger
directly-estimated coeﬃcients in our sample. For example the directly-estimated 15-year return
coeﬃcient is 1.38, while the implied coeﬃcient is only 0.80. The null has to generate a much
larger coeﬃcient before rejecting, and even with the more imprecise measurement inherent in
the direct regression, this is hard to do. If we set an even bar — the same sample coeﬃcient —
then the direct coeﬃcients would show lower power than implied estimates in every case.
In sum, long-horizon regression coeﬃcients have the potential for greater power to reject the
null of unforecastable returns, but one must look a good deal past the 5 year horizon to see much
of that power. Direct estimates of long-horizon coeﬃcients introduce additional uncertainty,
and that uncertainty can be large enough to obscure the greater power for some horizons and
sample sizes. This summary view brings together the analytical and simulation results on both
sides, including Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (2006)’s simulations showing low power,
and Campbell’s (2001) and Valkanov’s (2003) analysis showing good power in large samples and
at very long horizons.
The comparison between direct and indirect estimates in Table 7 is not particularly general.
Direct estimates, like kernel or nonparametric spectral density estimates, allow for unstructured
temporal correlations. They generally give more sampling variation than implied estimates.
Their advantage is that they measure the correct object if the long-run properties of the data
are not captured well by a low-order time-series model. In simulations, the data is generated
by the same ﬁrst-order VAR we estimate, so Table 7 does not address the basic advantage of
direct estimates. I argue in the next section that dividend yields and returns are, in fact, well
represented by a low-order VAR, which argues in favor of the indirect estimates, but even that
claim is special to this dataset.
How in general and in ﬁnite samples to balance the advantages and disadvantages of direct vs.
indirect estimates is beyond the scope of this paper. First, I am not interested in long-horizon
regression measurements per se. I am only interested in the implied long horizon estimates
as useful summaries of the joint distribution of one-year coeﬃcients br and φ. Second, the
investigation would take us far aﬁeld because it must consider null hypotheses that are diﬀerent
from the ﬁtted models. Finally, the point of Table 7 and this discussion is only to reconcile
the power of implied long-horizon regressions with the literature that seems to ﬁnd the opposite
result, and to some extent to reconcile the conﬂicting claims of that literature.
The development of an “optimal” strategy is also beyond my scope. Which combination of
br and φ or other statistics gives most evidence against the unforecastable-return null? I stop,
having documented that the implied long-horizon coeﬃcient br/(1−ρφ) is enough to reject the
null in our sample, without asking if there are other, even more powerful statistics. A serious
investigation of that issue has also to consider more complex time-series models, rather than
ﬁne-tune a statistic for one particular parameterization of a VAR(1) and one sample size.
298W h a t a b o u t . . .
8.1 Long-horizon estimates and hidden dividend growth movements
Perhaps the VAR(1) structure is too limiting. Perhaps prices move on news of dividends several
years in the future, news not seen in next year’s dividend. Managers do smooth dividends, and
many ﬁrms do not pay cash dividends, so the “dividend” is often a repurchase or cash acquisition
that comes many years later. Imputing multi-year dividend growth forecastability from one-year
forecastability and the dividend-yield autocorrelation may be severely constraining.
To address this question, I look more deeply at direct forecasts of long-horizon returns and













r (dt − pt)+εr
t+k.
As with their inﬁnite-horizon counterparts in Equations (15)-(17), these regressions amount to
a variance decomposition for dividend yields. Start with the ﬁnitely-iterated version of identity
(6),






ρj−1∆dt+j + ρk+1 (dt+k+1 − pt+k+1).
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Thus, we can read from the regression coeﬃcients directly what fraction of the variance of
dividend yields is due to k-period dividend growth forecasts, what fraction is due to k-period
return forecasts, and what fraction is due to k-period forecasts of future dividend yields. As
k →∞and if the last term vanishes (φ<1/ρ) we recover the identity blr
r − blr
d = 1 studied in
Section 4
Figure 7 presents direct estimates of long-horizon regression coeﬃcients in equation (23) as a
function of k. I do not calculate the last, future price-dividend ratio term as its value is implied
by the other two terms.
In the top panel of Figure 7, we see that dividend growth forecasts explain small fractions
of dividend yield variance at all horizons. The triangles in Figure 7 are direct regressions, e.g. Pk
j=1 ρj−1∆dt+j on dt − pt. The rise in these estimates in the top panel means that long-run
dividend growth moves in the wrong direction, explaining negative fractions of dividend yield
variation. The circles in Figure 7 sum individual regression coeﬃcients,
Pk
j=1 ρj−1β(∆dt+j,d t −













Figure 7: Regression forecasts of discounted dividend growth
Pk
j=1 ρj−1∆dt+j (top) and re-
turns
Pk
j=1 ρj−1rt+j (bottom) on the log dividend yield dt − pt, as a function of the hori-
zon k. Triangles are direct estimates, e.g. β
³Pk
j=1 ρj−1∆dt+j,d t − pt
´
: I form the weighted
long-horizon returns and run them on dividend yields. Circles sum individual estimates, e.g. Pk
j=1 ρj−1β (∆dt+j,d t − pt). I run dividend growth and return at year t+j on the dividend yield




pt). This estimate only diﬀers from the last one because it uses more data points. For example,
the ﬁrst year β(∆dt+1,d t −pt) in the 10-year k return is estimated using T −1d a t ap o i n t s ,n o t
T − 10 data points of the direct (triangle) estimate. Here we at least see the “right,” negative,
sign, though the magnitudes are still trivial.
By contrast, the return forecasts account for essentially all dividend yield volatility once one
looks out past 10 years. The regression coeﬃcients approach and even exceed one. This (with
a negative sign) is what dividend forecasts should look like if we are to hope that changing
expectations of dividend growth explain price variation. They do not come close, even in these
direct estimates that allow for unstructured temporal correlations.
Adding the long-run return and dividend-growth forecasts we see that the future dividend
yield term in (23) is near zero past the 10 year horizon. The point estimate of return predictabil-
ity is strong enough that we do not need bubbles to explain stock price variation in this direct
estimates, just as we found with long-horizon regression coeﬃcients implied by the VAR(1) in
Table 4.
31Despite the battering return forecasts br have taken in the 1990s, cutting return coeﬃcients br
almost in half, both these direct and the above indirect blr
r = br/(1−ρφ) long-horizon estimates
of Table 4 are very little changed since Cochrane (1992). The longer sample has a lower br, but
a larger φ,s obr/(1 − ρφ) is still just about exactly one.







/(1 − ρφ) and similarly for dividend growth, to give a visual sense of how well
the VAR ﬁts the direct estimates. The point estimates of the long-run regressions show slightly
stronger r e t u r nf o r e c a s t a b i l i t yt h a nt h ev a l u e si m p l i e db yt h eV A R ,a n dd i v i d e n dg r o w t ht h a t
goes even more in the “wrong” positive direction, though the diﬀerences are far from statistically
signiﬁcant. To the extent that there is any hidden multiperiod dividend growth forecastability
not captured by the VAR system, it goes the “wrong” way. Though low order VAR systems
do not always capture long-run dynamics well (for example, I ﬁnd this to be true for GNP in
Cochrane 1988), they seem to do so in this dataset.
(To keep the graph from getting too cluttered, and since our focus is on ﬁnite-sample dis-
tributions calculated from a simulation, I omit standard error bars from Figure 7. The best set
of asymptotic standard errors I calculated gives the a return-forecast t-statistic of about two at
all horizons. The dividend growth forecasts are completely insigniﬁcant.)
8.2 Repurchases
What about the fact that ﬁrms seem to smooth dividends, dividend payments seem to be
declining in favor of repurchases, and dividend behavior may be shifting over time? Dividends
as measured by CRSP capture all payments to investors, including cash mergers, liquidations,
and so forth as well as actual dividends. If a ﬁrm repurchases all of its shares, CRSP records
this event as a dividend payment. If a ﬁrm repurchases some of its shares, an investor may
choose to hold his shares, and the CRSP dividend series captures the eventual payments he
receives. Thus, there is nothing wrong in an accounting sense with using the CRSP dividends
series. The price really is the present value of these dividends.
8.3 Additional variables
While there is nothing wrong with using the dividend yield, one can use variables that adjust
for payout policies, as we can use any other variable in the time-t information set, to forecast
returns. Such forecasts can give even stronger evidence of return predictability, since the payout
yield is “more stationary” than the dividend yield (Michaely, Richardson and Roberts 2006).
For example Boudukh Richardson and Whitelaw (2006) report a 5.16% R2 using the dividend
yield, but 8.7%, 7.7% and 23.4% (!) R2 using various measures of the payout yield (i.e. including
repurchases). More generally, a large number of additional variables seem to forecast returns; for
example see the summary in Goyal and Welch (2006). While we cannot ﬁsh across variables for
t statistics anymore than we can ﬁsh across horizons, once we agree that dividend yields forecast
returns, additional variables can only in the end add to the evidence for return forecastability.
Additional variables can also predict dividend growth (for example, Ribeiro 2004, Lettau
and Ludvigson 2005). This fact does not imply that returns become less predictable. Our
identities that dividend growth predictability and return predictability add up only apply to
forecasts based on the dividend yield. Other variables can raise the predictability of dividend
growth and of returns. To be speciﬁc, consider any set of forecasting variables that includes the
32dividend yield. The return identity (6) implies
dt − pt = Et(rt+1) − Et(∆dt+1)+ρEt(dt+1 − pt+1) (24)
and the present value identity (14) is















Thus, by (24), if any variable helps to forecast one-period dividend growth, it must help to fore-
cast returns, or help to forecast future dividend yields. By (25), if any variable helps to forecast
long-run dividend growth, it must also help to forecast long-run returns. Again, considering
more variables can only make the evidence for return predictability stronger.
9C o n c l u s i o n
If returns really are not forecastable, then dividend growth must be forecastable in order to
generate the observed variation in dividend-price ratios. We should see that forecastability.
Yet, even looking 25 years out, there is not a shred of evidence that high market price-dividend
ratios are associated with higher subsequent dividend growth. Even if we convince ourselves
that the return-forecasting evidence crystallized in Fama and French’s (1988) regressions is
statistically insigniﬁcant, we still leave unanswered the challenge crystallized by Shiller’s (1981)
volatility tests: If not dividend growth or expected returns, what does move prices?
Setting up a null in which returns are not forecastable, and changes in expected dividend
growth explain the variation of dividend yields, I can check both dividend-growth and return
forecastability. I ﬁnd that the absence of dividend growth forecastability in our data provides
much stronger evidence against this null than does the presence of one-year return forecastability,
with probability values in the 1-2% range rather than in the 20% range.
The long-run coeﬃcients capture these observations in a single number, and tie them to
modern volatility tests. The point estimates are squarely in the bull’s eye that all variation
in price-dividend ratios is accounted for by time-varying expected returns, and none by time-
varying dividend growth forecasts. Tests based on these long-run coeﬃcients also give 1-2%
rejections.
Excess return forecastability is not a comforting result. Our lives would be so much easier if
we could trace price movements back to visible news about dividends or cashﬂows. Failing that,
it would be nice if high prices forecast dividend growth, so we could think agents see cash-ﬂow
information that we do not see. Failing that, it would be lovely if high prices were associated
with low interest rates or other observable movements in discount factors. Failing that, perhaps
time-varying expected excess returns that generate price variation could be associated with more
easily measurable time-varying standard deviations, so the market moves up and down a mean-
variance frontier with constant Sharpe ratio. Alas, the evidence so far seems to be that most
aggregate price variation can only be explained by rather nebulous variation in Sharpe ratios.
But that is where the data have forced us, and they still do so. The only good piece of news
is that observed return forecastability does seem to be just enough to account for the volatility
of price dividend ratios. If both return and dividend growth forecast coeﬃcients were small, we
would be forced to conclude that prices follow a “bubble” process, moving only on news (or,
frankly, opinion) of their own future values.
33The implications of excess return forecastability reach throughout ﬁnance and are only be-
ginning to be explored. The literature has focused on portfolio theory, i.e. the possibility that
a few investors can beneﬁt by market-timing portfolio rules. Even here, the signals are slow-
moving, really aﬀecting the static portfolio choices of diﬀerent generations rather than dynamic
portfolio choices of short-run investors, and parameter uncertainty greatly reduces the poten-
tial beneﬁts. Most seriously, these calculations face a classic Catch-22: if there are more than
measure zero of agents who should take the advice, the phenomenon will disappear. But if
expected excess returns really do vary by as much as their average levels, much of the rest of
ﬁnance still needs to be rewritten. For example, Mertonian state variables, long a theoretical
curiosity, but relegated to the back shelf by an empirical view that investment opportunities
are roughly constant, should in fact be at center stage of cross-sectional asset pricing. For
example, much of the beta of a stock or portfolio reﬂects covariation between ﬁrm and factor
(e.g. market) discount rates rather than reﬂecting the covariation between ﬁrm and market cash
ﬂows. For example, standard cost-of-capital calculations featuring the CAPM and a steady 6%
market premium need to be rewritten, at least recognizing the dramatic variation of the initial
premium, and more deeply recognizing likely changes in that premium over the lifespan of a
project and the multiple pricing factors that predictability implies.
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3711 Appendix
This Appendix documents the likelihood function plotted in Figure 4 and used in the last row
of Table 5. The unconditional likelihood for an AR(1),
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The second and third terms penalize φ near 1. We can analytically maximize out a and σ2 given
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Figure 4 uses these values of σ2 and a for any given φ to plot the likelihood as a function of φ
only.









(xt − a − φxt−1)
2




























(xt − a − φxt−1)
a =
1
T − 1
T X
t=2
(xt − φxt−1).
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